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In this note, I present a problem for a certain natural view about the structure of the world.
I show that this view is committed to a particular strengthening of atomism, which I call super-
atomism. Superatomism has some counterintuitive consequences (e.g. it rules out whatMarkosian []
calls the ‘pointy view’ of simples). I consider some ways of avoiding this commitment, and draw
some additional implications for priority monism.
Consider the following picture of the structure of the world, which I will call the 
.
Mereology Necessarily, the parthood relation is governed by the axioms of classical mereology.
Priority Necessarily, the existence of parts is metaphysically prior to the existence of the wholes
they compose.
Well-foundedness Necessarily, the metaphysical priority relation is well-founded; there can be
no inﬁnite regress of priority.
e  thesis is accepted by a great many contemporarymetaphysicians—most saliently,
David Lewis []. Importantly,  is quite a bit stronger than required for the argument.
All that is required is the assumption that the parthood relation is a partial order. (For ease of pre-
sentation, though, it will be useful to stay within the setting of classical mereology.) e 
thesis also seems to be a predominant view in contemporary metaphysics. ere are several kinds
of ontological dependence, but the notion of grounding (introduced by Kit Fine [, ]) has been
gaining traction. I use ‘metaphysical priority’ here to be fairly neutral with respect to precisely
which kind of dependence relation is taken to be in play. e - thesis is a
standard assumption about priority relations. e thought is that if there were inﬁnite descending
priority chains, we would be deferring the ‘ground’ of things indeﬁnitely. e existence of objects
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could, in some sense, never get started. Witness Schaﬀer [, p. ]:
[I]f there actually is an inﬁnite descent, then there are no simple particles that could
suﬃce to explain everything. Indeed, there will be nominima for the minimal nihilist
to recognize. Her ontology would drain away down a bottomless pit.
Consider also Lowe [, p. ]
To that I add here one further assumption concerning ‘strong’ existential dependency,
namely, that there cannot be inﬁnite descending chains of objects standing in rela-
tions of strong existential dependency to one another: in short, that all real existence
must be ‘grounded’ or ‘well-founded’. Such an ‘axiom of foundation’ is quite proba-
bly beyond conclusive proof and yet I ﬁnd the vertiginous implications of its denial
barely comprehensible.
Although it seems natural to want to hold these theses together, the   has some
problematic consequences. For one thing, the   rules out the possibility of atomless
gunk — that is, worlds in which everything has a proper part.¹ It is well-known that there are
gunky models of classical mereology.² But gunky worlds are worlds with inﬁnite descending
proper parthood chains. By , we know that the metaphysical priority relation runs in
parallel with the proper parthood relation. So, it would follow that there are inﬁnite descending
chains of metaphysical priority. But that contradicts -.
Schaﬀer [, §.] recognises this entailment, and uses it as a reductio of the  thesis.
In rejecting , he suggests that metaphysical priority runs from whole to part rather than
the other way around.
However, those sympathetic to the   will not be persuaded. A reasonable re-
sponse would be to accept this consequence, and insist on the existence of a fundamental level of
mereological atoms — objects with no proper parts.
¹See Sider [] for more on the debate over gunk.
²e classic model given by the regular open sets of some topological space is due to Tarski [].
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Atomism Necessarily, the parthood relation is governed by the axioms of classical atomistic mere-
ology.
But there is a further entailment of the   that has typically gone unnoticed. ere
are models of classical atomistic mereology in which the proper parthood relation is not well-
founded. at is, there are atomistic models with inﬁnite descending proper parthood chains.
Gunky worlds are not the only ones that have this feature.
An example of an atomic model with inﬁnite descending chains is given by considering the set
of all subsets of the natural numbers (}(N)), with parthood modelled by the subset relation. e
atoms of this mereology are the singletons (fng for each n in N). Consider an ‘object’ represented
by the set of all m such that m > n for some n. Now, the set of all such objects for every n in N
is an inﬁnite descending chain.³
Another such model is given simply by the non-empty regions of three-space (R3) with part-
hood modelled by the subset relation. e atoms in this model are singletons (i.e. point-sized
regions). But take any cube (e.g. [0; 1]3); such a region will have inﬁnitely-many proper subre-
gions (e.g. [0; 1n ]
3 for each natural number n). But again, this is an atomistic model.
If either of these models represent metaphysical possibilities, by  there are inﬁnite
descending chains of metaphysical priority. But again, that contradicts -.
ese models of mereology have been widely overlooked; but it is important to note that the
  cannot accept them. e latter model is particularly signiﬁcant insofar as one
thinks that the mereological structure of the world mirrors the structure of space.⁴ For example,
this   would rule out the   of mereological simples, which states that
an object is simple iﬀ it occupies a point-sized region of space.⁵
So, we have it that our initially attractive and very natural picture of the world has committed
³anks to Andrew Bacon here.
⁴For example, Brzozowski [, §] argues against certain views by using a version of a regress argument which
overlooks these non-wellfounded models.
⁵At least if one accepts that there are extended objects at all, then they would have to be made up of inﬁnitely-many
unextended simples. But such a structure would immediately yield inﬁnite descending parthood chains, contradicting
the  . See Markosian [] for more discussion of rival views of simples.
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us to superatomism, the view atomism plus the further commitment that any subdivision of the
world must be atomistic as well.
Superatomism Necessarily, the parthood relation is governed by the axioms of classical super-
atomistic mereology.
Superatomistic mereology has not been previously explored; however, its mathematical models
are well-studied.⁶
Let B be a Boolean algebra. en B is superatomic iﬀ every subalgebra of B is atomic.
Since models of classical mereology are eﬀectively complete Boolean algebras, the models of su-
peratomistic mereology are complete superatomic Boolean algebras.
Clearly,  entails that there are no (and could not be) inﬁnite descending part-
hood chains. After all, one way of cashing out well-foundedness is as follows: a partial ordering
relation R over a domain is well-founded iﬀ every non-empty subset of the domain has an R-
minimal element. Since metaphysical priority is meant to be a well-founded relation, this displays
precisely why we are committed to every substructure of the world-structure being atomistic.
ere is another way of avoiding inﬁnite descending parthood chains: accept that the world is
(necessarily) ﬁnite. If there are only ﬁnitely many things, then parthood chains will all be ﬁnite.
A strict ﬁnitist about the structure of the world will also accept superatomism (as every ﬁnite
Boolean algebra is superatomic). But superatomism is more general; it allows for worlds to be
inﬁnite while still ruling out inﬁnite descending chains.
e upshot of the above argument is this: the   as expressed above has a com-
mitment to superatomism. To those who do not wish to accept superatomism, there are a few
options.
e ﬁrst alternative is to reject -, and perhaps weaken the thesis from
requiring priority to be well-founded, to merely requiring any priority chain to ‘bottom out’ at
⁶Superatomic Boolean alegebras were ﬁrst studied by Mostowski and Tarski []. For a good introduction see
Day [].
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some stage (inﬁnite or otherwise).⁷ e challenge to defenders of - is to
decide whether this weakened thesis will do everything one wants it to. (is would be worth
deeper exploration in any case since similar issues crop up in other areas of metaphysics. For
example, consider the corresponding thesis regarding causal chains. Is it plausible that causal
chains might extend inﬁnitely far back into the past so long as there is some ﬁrst cause which
happened before the inﬁnite causal chain? And what would it mean for that ‘ﬁrst cause’ to set the
universe in motion if there is no ‘ﬁrst’ eﬀect, but only an inﬁnite sequence of eﬀects getting ever
and ever closer to the start?)
A second alternative is to reject . After all, classical mereology is controversial
independently. But one must keep in mind, however, that the argument depends only on the
assumption that parthood is a partial order, which holds in nearly all mereologies.⁸ Some (e.g.
Simons []) have even contended that the partial order axioms for parthood are analytic. But
this move won’t really help solve the problem, since holding onto - would
require giving up  as well.⁹
A ﬁnal alternative would be to reject .¹⁰ One promising proposal along these lines
is Schaﬀer’s priority monism which reverses the order of mereological dependence.
Priority* Necessarily, the existence of wholes is metaphysically prior to the existence of the parts
⁷is is the option pursued by Cameron [, p. ], who is (to my knowledge) one of the only people to be explicit
about the diﬀerence between the well-foundedness of priority vs. the existence of a fundamental level.
It is false to say that an entity x is ontologically independent iﬀ there is no entity y such that x is directly
ontologically dependent on y; this thought depends on the assumption that for any dependent entity
there is a ﬁnite number of steps taking you from it to its ultimate ontological basis. is should be
rejected.
⁸For an exception, see Cotnoir and Bacon [].
⁹Whether non-wellfounded parthood relations and well-founded priority relations play nicely together is an inter-
esting question, one which I hope to explore in future work.
¹⁰A further option would be to reject the modal strength of the  view. It is usually thought that metaphysical
principles hold with metaphysical necessity. However, one might reject this and e.g. think with Cameron [] that
mereological principles are metaphysically contingent. Or one might reject that metaphysical priority always tracks
the mereological structure of a given world. Or one might think that the well-foundedness of priority is merely a
contingent matter. is would open up the possibility of a view which accepts the actual truth of demodalised variants
of , , and - (and hence the actual truth of demodalised ),
whilst still accepting the possibility of the various models considered above. While I ﬁnd this view interesting, I do not
have space to consider it further here.
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they comprise.
But given - and , it will follow that inﬁnite ascending proper
parthood chains are impossible. So, at the very least, this entails a commitment to the existence
of a universal object — an object which is not a proper part of anything. Indeed, Schaﬀer appears
to think this is enough to avoid the problem (even though it is clear that Schaﬀer genuinely
intends the stronger - thesis, rather than a weaker version which requires
merely a fundamental level.)¹¹
Grounding is, however, exactly like the classical mereological relation of having as
a proper part, which is irreﬂexive, asymmetric, and transitive, and whose ordering
provably is well-founded (in fact it provably has a unique foundation, the whole
universe).
e intuition that being requires a ground […] is the analogue of the set-theoretic
axiom of Foundedness ([, p. ; footnote ]
But a similar diﬃculty arises here, analogous to the problem for atomism. ere are mod-
els of classical mereology that contain both a universal element and inﬁnite ascending proper
parthood chains. Consider again the non-empty regions of three-space. Any ascending proper
parthood chain from any object (other than the universe) will be inﬁnite. If such models corre-
spond to metaphysical possibilities, Schaﬀer has an even further commitment to what we might
call noetherianism, which would require that every substructure of the world have a maximal ob-
ject.¹²
Priority monists might likewise weaken the - thesis etc., but the retreat
to * will not be enough.
While the   is a natural and prima facie attractive picture of the structure of
the world, it is also a stronger collection of theses than one might have thought. When dealing
¹¹See also Schaﬀer [, p. ].
¹²e terminology is again borrowed from algebra where e.g. a noetherian group is a group that satisﬁes the ascending
chain condition on subgroups.
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with the inﬁnite it is very easy to overlook possibilities. But these possibilities are crucial to a
correct understanding of the structure of the world. If one accepts , , and
-, then one is not just committed to atomism but also to a superatomistic
picture of the world. Priority monists like Schaﬀer avoid atomism by replacing  with
*, but they face a similar further commitment to noetherianism. Whether this provides
a good reason to reject the   is for future work to decide.¹³
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